

May 27, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

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provide the direction, the formulation as well as the execution of Federal programs.

During House and Senate hearings each year, the testimony of private citizens, physicians, eminent authorities in biomedical research, and directors and staff members of health and welfare agencies is collected, then painstakingly sifted and weighed. On the basis of this counsel, the results of existing programs are evaluated, earlier programs may be re-shaped or abandoned, and new programs formulated as the current needs of clinical and laboratory research dictate.

In essence, then, it is you, more than my colleagues in the House and in the Senate or myself, that indicate the direction that Federal programs in health and research will take. Our job in Congress is never to tell you what to do, but rather to find out what you need in order to do your job, try to supply it, then leave you alone to get on with it. For only in this way will Federal programs in research and health have significance in aiding you in your life-long dedication to bettering the health and welfare of our people.

War Policy

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. ARCH A. MOORE, JR.

OF WEST VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, May 27, 1966

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Speaker, increased concern of our Nation's policy in South Vietnam comes daily from various parts of our country and continuing contributions are made to the national dialog that is being generated by what we are doing in southeast Asia.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I include in my remarks an editorial appearing in the distinguished West Virginia newspaper, the Wheeling Intelligencer, edited by Thomas O'Brien Flynn, a newspaper that was completely devoted to the candidacy and election of Barry Goldwater as President of the United States so that my colleagues may have the benefit of the thinking of this distinguished newspaper and journalist:

WAR POLICY: IT'S NOT THE LEGALITY BUT THE WISDOM OF OUR ACTION THAT'S PERTINENT

The Viet Nam debate has shifted emphasis from the wisdom of the policy that led us to armed intervention to the legality of the engagement itself.

Secretary Rusk, turning up for another session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—which presumably was considering the \$3.4 billion foreign aid bill—came armed with a legal brief supporting the validity of our armed participation.

Our commitment to Viet Nam, according to Rusk and the brief, had its origin in the post World War II period when Mr. Truman was President. Throughout that time, Rusk said, it was the American position that "we had an important stake in the security and stability of Southeast Asia."

"Military actions of the United States in support of Viet Nam," the Secretary continued, "including air attacks on North Viet Nam, are authorized under international law by the well-established principle of collective defense against armed aggression."

He added that there is nothing in either American or international law that requires a declaration of war to authorize American military action in Southeast Asia. Legally, he asserted, this country is on firm ground.

Rusk's position was challenged immediately by Sen. WAYNE MORSE, Oregon Democrat, who is perhaps the most severe and persistent critic of our Viet Nam activity.

As with most arguments involving a legal point the case, no doubt could be decided either way. As a matter of fact most wars can be challenged from one side or the other on legal grounds. Fault must lie somewhere or there would be no war, and any belligerent could make out a good case in support of his position. So, little is to be accomplished, it would seem to this newspaper, by trying to establish the validity of our engagement from a standpoint of international law, although it might serve a good national purpose to explore the point made by Rusk that there is nothing in American law to require a declaration of war to justify armed action by American forces in Southeast Asia. If this is true it will come as quite a surprise to the American people, who had nurtured the belief that only Congress has the authority to declare war.

But the legality of our involvement, it seems to this newspaper, is the less serious consideration. What is serious is the wisdom or necessity of it from a standpoint of national welfare.

If we are theoretically committed by treaty—and this is a moot question—to do what we are doing, was it incumbent on us to assume in the first place the obligation of resisting aggression all over Southeast Asia, all over the world for that matter? Was it necessary to our national security? Is it possible for us to do what we undertook to do?

These, it seems to The Intelligencer, are the important questions. And the answers, to our way of thinking, are perfectly clear. We had no such obligation. We do not have it now. Our security was in no way threatened. Finally—what is happening in Viet Nam would seem to furnish sufficient proof of this—we have assumed an assignment quite beyond our ability to deliver.

Why, then, go on with the war?

Teachers Corps in Disguise

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. E. Y. BERRY

OF SOUTH DAKOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, May 27, 1966

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, it is with great alarm that I received a press release from the Office of Economic Opportunity which all but announced that they are setting up a teachers corps in disguise.

The announcement said the OEO has concluded a contract with the National Education Association to enable teachers and counselors to work in Jobs Corps centers and then spend a year introducing new teaching methods in their local public schools. This is the same type of program which was rejected by Congress only last month when both the House and Senate refused to appropriate funds for the Teacher Corps program.

This is a deliberate and intentional violation of the wishes of the American people and the intent of Congress.

The OEO's own press release announced that the new program "will make it possible to spread the methods used in the Job Corps centers through local communities." It went on to quote OEO Director Sargent Shriver as saying:

The new contracts would make it possible to start feeding the educational innovations of the Job Corps program into the public school system.

The new OEO venture smacks of Federal indoctrination and Federal control with identical "internships" and work-study programs only rejected a few weeks ago.

This dangerous and deliberate thwarting of the intent of Congress must be exposed to the American people and must be directly stopped by special legislation if necessary.

Conduct of the War in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. ROBERT DOLE

OF KANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, May 27, 1966

Mr. DOLE. Mr. Speaker, I feel certain Members and others who read the RECORD will be interested in an editorial written by Clelland Cole, publisher of the St. John News, St. John, Kans.

Millions agree with the thoughts expressed so articulately by Mr. Cole. Visits with Kansans and mail from my district lead me to believe people are confused, frustrated, and in basic agreement with the thoughts expressed in the editorial.

SHERMAN SAID IT ABOUT WAR—REMEMBER?

Rumblings over the conduct of the war in Viet Nam are growing louder and angrier.

As more and more wives, and parents, and families are told the sad news that "He died a hero's death," in the far off muck of an Asian jungle, the queries become more and more insistent: "Why do we piddle around? Why don't we win this war?"

As shortages of bombs are denied and the ones denying are proven to be bald face liars, as fighting men send the word back home that they lack sufficient equipment, as military leaders fret and fume and bash their fists against trees in utter frustration, as taxpayers are bled white, wondering what manner of insanity could possess men that they should pour untold billions in the war with one hand and scatter many times more billions into the bottomless maw called "foreign aid," with the other, the rumblings become grumblings and the public temper arises.

Wouldn't it be wonderful if this war could be ended now—at once?

It just cannot be.

We may as well prepare for a long, bitter, trying, expensive, bloody conflict.

We must not overlook the fact that we are fighting an enemy which has proven to be far, far tougher and more stubborn than we had imagined. (By "we," I mean the leaders of this nation who have directed the war, and who are solely and completely responsible for the U.S. policies in this war.)

This enemy is going to take a lot of convincing.

He is immune to reason, and outpourings of blood and lives and resources affect him not at all.

But he must be taught that no matter what the cost in American lives, no matter how many oceans of American blood are spilled on the battlefield, no matter how many planes, and helicopters, and men we lose, no matter how many billions we wring

from the struggling taxpayer, we will not be swerved from our goal.

This enemy must learn, once and for all, that we will pour whatever lives are needed, whatever billions are required, and take whatever time is necessary to show him, emphatically, decisively, and unequivocally, that he cannot lose!

He still seems to have some doubts about it. He still seems plagued by an uneasy suspicion that the United States might decide to unleash one teeny fraction of its military might and blast him into kingdom come by nightfall.

He still seems fearful that our fighting men just might ignore the battle plans from Washington and really go on the warpath and hammer the living daylight out of him and all he owns.

He is tremendously hard headed, this enemy.

We may be years on end finally convincing him that we simply will not let him lose. With the record of the Korean war and the Cuban fiasco, it seems ridiculous that the Viet Cong should require so much convincing. He needs but to look at those episodes to see that we do not intend to win, and we do not intend for the enemy to lose.

Once we have him firmly convinced that he cannot lose, perhaps we can get him to the conference table where history proves beyond doubt that he can't possibly lose.

Fighting a war is tough enough when, with the wherewithal and the desire and the loyalty of home folks, victory is the goal. But when the aim is to deny our fighting men the chance for victory, and the fool enemy just won't be convinced, then war really gets to be hell.

Tight, Mr. McNamara, HHH, LBJ, et al?

The Purpose of the Cape Cod National Seashore Is Conservation

SPEECH
OF

HON. HASTINGS KEITH

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 26, 1966

Mr. KEITH. Mr. Speaker, the legislation establishing the Cape Cod National Seashore specifies that the seashore's primary purpose is conservation of the unique natural, historical, and scientific features of the area. The congressional sponsors of the legislation intended recreational uses of the seashore to be secondary and restricted to those specifically permitted in the act.

The Secretary of the Interior has placed the seashore, for administrative purposes, in the category of recreational areas. Although we are confident that it is the Secretary's intention to administer the seashore according to the provisions of the legislation, we fear that in future years this categorizing of the seashore could make conservation secondary. In the light of the fact that last year the number of visitors to the seashore increased by nearly 500,000 over the previous year, the problem cannot be ignored.

To prevent perversion of the purpose of the legislation, the Senate committee in its report on appropriations for the Department of the Interior, H.R. 14215, included the following statement:

The committee believes that even though the Secretary of the Interior has included all

national seashores in a recreational category, the purpose of the Cape Cod National Seashore should continue to be one of conservation as set forth in the legislation authorizing its establishment.

I applaud the reaffirmation of the original intention of Congress and trust that in future years the seashore will be administered in accordance with our purposes.

The following editorial from the Cape Cod Standard-Times expresses my feeling in this matter very well:

GUIDELINE OFFERED

Three cheers for the Senate Appropriations Committee!

In a statement after acting on funds for acquisition of more land for Cape Cod National Seashore the committee noted that it was the understanding of Congress and others involved with the Cape Seashore that it was established to conserve the dunes and beaches of the Lower Cape.

It was not, the committee statement said, to be used for recreational purposes.

The committee said that while all the National Seashores were listed by Interior Secretary Stewart L. Udall as recreation areas, this was just for classification sake and did not mean they were to be used for recreation purposes primarily.

Thus the senators have put the Interior Department and the National Park Service and those lawmakers and others who are so anxious to develop the Cape Cod Seashore as a recreational area on notice that this is not to be done, this is not what was planned.

For many Cape Codders who have been saying this for so long, and who appeared to be doing nothing but talk into the wind, the senators have provided a big boost.

The idea of preserving the Lower Cape areas is favored by most, but the idea of developing these sites to be recreational areas for the millions who live in the Northeast is not favored by many Cape Codders.

That these beautiful natural areas will be saved for posterity is fine.

Let us hope that the recreation forces won't disregard this warning from the Senate Appropriations Committee and try to make the Lower Cape a giant recreational area open to one and all at the expense of the resort business that supports a growing Cape.

U.S.S. "George Washington Carver"

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. THOMAS G. MORRIS

OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, May 27, 1966

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Speaker, on May 8, 1966, I received a letter from Vice Adm. H. G. Rickover, Deputy Commander for Nuclear Propulsion Naval Ship Systems Command, Department of the Navy, telling me of the successful first sea trials of our 37th Polaris nuclear submarine, the U.S.S. *George Washington Carver*.

In this communication Admiral Rickover included an outstanding biographical sketch on Mr. George Washington Carver, for whom the submarine was named. So that many more Americans will have the privilege and opportunity to read what I consider an outstanding letter and a very fine biography of a great American, I am including his remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

U.S.S. "GEORGE WASHINGTON

CARVER" CSSBN-6561

At Sea, North Atlantic, May 8, 1966.

The Honorable THOMAS G. MORRIS,
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: We have just successfully completed the first sea trials of our 37th Polaris nuclear submarine. The USS *George Washington Carver* was built by the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Virginia. We also have in operation 22 attack type nuclear submarines, making a total of 59.

This ship is named for George W. Carver, a botanist and chemurgist renowned in the annals of American scientific agriculture. The child of slaves, he did not know the day of his birth. Even the year is not certain, but he thought it was 1860. Where he was born, however, is not in doubt. In 1943, shortly after he died at Tuskegee Institute, Alabama, both houses of Congress passed, without a dissenting vote, a bill authorizing erection of a national monument at his birthplace in Diamond Grove, Missouri. In fourscore years, George W. Carver had come a long way and accomplished a great deal.

None of it had come easy. His start in life was most inauspicious. A sickly infant, orphaned before he was a year old, it seemed unlikely he would survive. He lost his father in an accident and was soon after kidnaped, together with his mother and sister, by marauding nightriders. Those were lawless times. Stealing slaves for sale to plantations in the Deep South was not uncommon. But George Carver was such a puny baby that the kidnapers had no use for him, and so his mother was able to get him released in return for a race horse valued at \$300. Of mother and sister nothing was ever heard.

Hard as it was to be a slave child without kith or kin, by great good fortune his master Moses Carver (from whom he took his surname) was not a typical planter but a plain farmer, one of the so-called "Black Republican abolitionist Germans," or "lop-eared Dutch," as they were contemptuously called, who had migrated to Missouri in the 1830's. He was opposed to slavery, but he and his wife were childless and middle-aged; they needed help and servants were not to be had. So Moses bought a slave girl from a neighbor for \$700. After she had been abducted, he took it upon himself to raise her small son. Slavery ended when the boy was four years old but he remained with the Carvers and was treated much as any other farm boy. There was a lot of work to be done and George was expected to do his share. He was an especially apt pupil in all the domestic chores around the house and showed early that he had a way with growing things. People called him "plant doctor" for he could cure any ailing plant; he seemed to know instinctively what it needed in order to grow.

The boy was born with a keen mind, fantastically clever hands and so great a thirst for knowledge that no obstacle could bar him from obtaining an education. Of rebuffs he suffered many, but he was also often given a helping hand. The free school nearby was barred to him, whereupon Mrs. Carver gave him an old blue-back Speller and with her help he taught himself to read and write. Thereafter he was hardly ever without a book in his hand. He would prop it up while he washed and ironed, these being some of the chores that earned him a living while he gradually accumulated school credits.

At 10 he decided he must find a school and so he left the Carvers, all his possessions in a small bundle over his shoulder. Thus began an Odyssey that was to take him in short stages northward geographically and upward educationally. At several critical times during his 30-year quest for an education, luck or his pleasing personality, or perhaps a combination of both, brought him into contact with warmhearted childless

must also refer to his charming wife, Bess, who was the power behind the throne. I am certain that many in the Senate join me in wishing him a long and most pleasant retirement.

The man and his performance are perfectly captured by Harry L. Tennant's article in the April 1966, issue of the *Cahners publication Modern Railroads*. I ask unanimous consent to have the article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

END OF A LEGISLATIVE ERA?

The retirement of Lloyd W. Smith, of the Burlington and Great Northern Railroads from the Washington legislative scene marks what may very well be the end of the personal handling of railroad problems in Congress. After some 24 years pushing the cause of his railroad—especially in recent times during the heated per diem battle—Mr. Smith retires as the industry moves toward a more consolidated approach. Many persons in Congress see in this trend less emphasis on efforts to fight for single rail causes.

Mr. Smith's determined fight to win more support for the western railroad's car ownership cause touched nearly every facet of Congress at one time or another. One Senate source pointed out that his personal efforts in bringing about a boosting of car rentals undoubtedly returned to western railroads a sizable profit. This was because he continuously kept not only the leaders in Congress aware of the issues, but saw to it that everyone down to the receptionist in a congressional office was acquainted with his railroad's problems. His personal and effective approach is not likely to be seen again.

SO-CALLED RIOTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, when I reported to the Senate recently on my trip to Vietnam I remarked on the nature of the so-called riots there, saying they were not aimed at Americans directly but at the domestic political situation.

In a recent column in the *Evening Star*, Foreign Affairs Editor Crosby S. Noyes has written from Saigon to the effect that the riots are staged examples of what he calls tactical anti-Americanism not really meant to intimidate Americans, but to cause us to reconsider our support for the policies of the Ky government. The riots happen, as Mr. Noyes points out, but they do not constitute a way of life in Saigon. Says Noyes:

The impression that Saigon today—or at any time is a seething cauldron of violence is entirely fanciful.

So it is, Mr. President, that we get a distorted picture because the riots, quite naturally, make news. There is another type of distortion, and it is an indefensible sort, to which the *Washington Post* called attention in its editorial "The Revisionists" yesterday. This is the distortion of some critics of our foreign policy, who in order to prove their point have been busily rewriting history. The *Post* editorial gives us an excellent example to digest.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that both Mr. Noyes' article from the *Evening Star* and the *Washington Post* editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article and editorial were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the *Washington Post*, May 2, 1966]

THE REVISIONISTS

Some of the critics of American policy in South Vietnam, in order to prove the Chinese Communists devoid of aggressive purpose, have been trying to rewrite the history of the last 20 years.

A notable example of this kind of double-think is an article entitled: "Chinese Aggression: Myth or Menace," written by Charles S. Burchill, printed by The Study Group on China Policy of Vancouver, B.C., and circulated by the American Friends Service Committee office in Seattle.

He begins his proof of Chinese virtue with the Korean War and produces a rewrite of that episode that is an affront to scholarship, an outrage to history and a triumph of double-think that even transcends the facility of the Soviet rewriters who do over Soviet history to suit annual alterations of policy.

"On May 30, 1950," he writes, "the government of Syngman Rhee in South Korea was decisively defeated in a general election, winning only 49 out of 219 seats."

The election actually resulted in the election of 133 Independents, 46 Rhee minority party members and 31 members of minority parties opposed to Rhee. In the previous election 85 Independents were elected, 55 Syngman Rhee followers, 28 Korean Democrat Party candidates and 32 from minor parties. So the Rhee party support dropped from 55 to 46—but the coalition that had previously ruled then re-elected P. H. Shinicky chairman of the Assembly, and went on to form the government that ran the Korean War. So Rhee's coalition regime was not "decisively defeated" but continued to command a ruling majority in the Assembly.

Then, says Mr. Burchill, "John Foster Dulles flew to Korea, and on June 19 (1950) addressed the South Korean National Assembly, pledging continued American aid, but only if Syngman Rhee's minority government continued in power."

Now, the truth is that John Foster Dulles, as a special assistant to the Secretary of State, did address the Assembly and did pledge American aid—but he did not say one word about making that aid contingent on the continued rule of Syngman Rhee or on any other political decision in South Korea. Without condition of any kind, he promised, "The American people give you their support, both moral and material, consistent with your own respect and your primary dependence on your own effort." There is not a single word in this address about continuing the Rhee government.

Then came the invasion from the North. By all competent accounts the North Koreans attacked the South, but Dr. Burchill finds the genesis shrouded in obscurity. He is not sure who attacked first. He says:

"Both sections had large armies, equipped and trained by their foreign sponsors. However the southern army showed little willingness to fight for the government that had been repudiated. The northern army encountered little resistance from the southern forces, and there was no popular opposition to its advance."

Actually, a heavily armored North Korean force of more than 154,000, with 242 Soviet-made T-34 tanks, 1900 heavy weapons and 211 military planes, attacked by surprise the force of South Korea (numbering 100,000 at the start of the war but only recently expanded from a 25,000-man constabulary) and equipped with no tanks, 20 armored cars, 700 guns and 22 light planes. Not surprisingly, the lightly armed South Korean constabulary was no match for the North Korean armored force and fell back clear to the Pusan perimeter before it could regroup.

Although the United Nations repeatedly branded the later intervention by 300,000 Chinese Communists as "aggression," this invasion from China is dismissed by Burchill as a response to U.N. actions, proven by the fact that the Chinese forces were promptly withdrawn after the cease fire.

The beginning of the Korean War may be obscure to Mr. Burchill, but to competent historians there was no obscurity. Fairbank, Relschauer and Craig, in their *East Asia: the Modern Transformation*, say of the start of the war: "The North Korean surprise attack on June 25, 1950, was at once condemned by the United Nations Security Council . . . under the well-prepared North Korean assault, the outnumbered Korean-American forces initially were forced back southeast of the Nakdong River." Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in October, 1950, John K. Fairbank said: "Our military resistance to Communist aggression in Korea has been entirely necessary and unavoidable . . ."

It is the privilege and duty of those who wish to dissent politically to try to change the history of the future; but their efforts to change the history of the past in order to absolve the Chinese Communists of the odium of previous aggression will not deceive or mislead any informed person in the West. Fairbank estimates the Chinese had 900,000 casualties in the Korean War. They were not engaged in peaceful demonstrations at the time.

The Study Group on China Policy says it was formed for the purpose of "raising the level in Canada of knowledge and debate on China." The circulation of a farago of fiction and nonsense such as this will hardly accomplish that purpose. And the American Friends Service Committee, by disseminating such a distorted version of the past casts doubt upon its view of the present.

[From the *Washington Evening Star*, May 23, 1966]

POINT OF VIEW: VIET RIOTS GROW IN THE TELLING

(By Crosby S. Noyes, foreign affairs editor of the *Star*)

SAIGON.—Developments here today and news filtering back from Washington suggest that this is an excellent time to declare a moratorium on sweeping statements about the future of the American involvement in Viet Nam.

Once again an outbreak of inspired anti-American rioting is leading the news from Saigon. And once again the result is likely to be a goodly amount of wattle shaking and table pounding among the more impressionable members of the World's greatest deliberative body in Washington.

Given an admittedly messy situation in Viet Nam, there is of course a great temptation to sound off in a pox on both your houses tone.

But those who succumb to it should realize quite clearly that they are in fact encouraging the rioters and doing precisely what the Communists in this country hope they will do.

It is also possible to form a completely distorted impression of what's really going on here.

News stories are accurate enough. Americans in Saigon have been shouted at, spat on, chased around, and occasionally roughed up.

The distortion, however, is the question of focus.

News stories are zeroed in on what happens at a particular place and at a particular time.

What happens the rest of the time or in the city as a whole is not exactly the stuff headlines are made of.

The impression that Saigon today—or at any time—is a seething cauldron of violence is entirely fanciful.

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The problems can be summed up in five words: budget and limitations on personnel. Mr. President, I would suggest that a program as valuable as this should receive all the support it needs from Congress and, if more money is needed, we should provide it.

Turning to newspapers and periodicals as vehicles of the printed word, we find conditions which would seem strange—perhaps intolerable—to the average citizen of the United States.

We take for granted our morning and evening newspapers, complete with news of the day and replete with commentary, advertising, and features to satisfy every member of the family. We do not question the comparatively low cost, even grumbling when a daily raises its price to, say, 10 cents. We accept without wonder the rapid reporting of news from wherever in the world it happens to be made. The fat, heavy Sunday paper is practically a fixture of the American way of life.

In many parts of the world—and Latin America is one of them—this is not the way things are.

About 85 percent of the world's consumption of newsprint occurs in North America, Europe, and the U.S.S.R.—where only a third of the world's population lives. The rest of the world—Africa, Asia, and Latin America—uses the remaining 15 percent for the other two-thirds of the world's people. Looking at it from another angle and more specifically, we see that there are some 25 copies of daily newspapers per 100 persons in the United States—but, in Latin America, only 8 per 100.

Nor can the Latin American take for granted a low-priced daily newspaper, complete with news from all over the world, plus assorted features. Economic conditions being what they are, the price of the newspaper represents something tangible. Newsprint limitations do not permit the inclusion of many features, by our standards. And the publishers, with a few notable exceptions, cannot afford to buy the fast, up-to-the-minute news from the commercial press wire services.

None of this, however, makes the Latin American press any the less an important factor in the area's politics.

The USIA's Press and Publication Service engages in activities designed to strengthen the responsible Latin American press, without in any way competing with American commercial press wire services. For example:

Monday through Friday of each week, via teletype, an "American Republic File" is transmitted in Spanish to USIA's posts in 19 countries of Latin America. This schedule permits the transmission of 50,000 words weekly. The file carries all important texts—such as presidential statements—interviews, features, selected news stories, and USIA-produced commentaries. Additional material is supplied for weekend editions.

Another wireless file, in English, is transmitted daily, Monday through Friday for a total of 20,000 words each week. This is sent to Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo in Brazil, where it is translated into

Portuguese; but it is also monitored by Kingston, Georgetown, and seven other Caribbean and Latin American posts.

The press and publications service further processes about 15,000 words a week of "mailer" copy, known as "slow output." Included are special packets—on, for example, U.S. cultural developments, women's activities, and so forth—picture stories, labor items, youth news, Alliance for Progress material, and items which factually unmask Communist objectives and activities.

Approximately 2,000 photoprints on 70 to 90 subjects are airmailed monthly to 28 posts in Latin America, with 19 of the posts additionally receiving copy negatives of the same subjects from which they can reproduce additional photos.

About the same number of plastic plates of five different cartoon strips are serviced weekly to 250 Latin American newspapers. One of these—"Liborito"—is designed specifically for Latin American audiences and calls attention to the sinister nature of Castroism by means of satirical strokes of the cartoonist's pen.

Over 50 million copies of cartoon books have been produced and sent out for distribution. Fourteen deal with the Alliance for Progress and self-help, eight with the menace of Castroism, and six with democratic citizenship.

The output of USIA's Press and Publications Service for Latin America is supplemented by a regional service center in Mexico City. Additionally, 19 USIA posts in the area publish 26 periodicals, mostly low-cost and in keeping with the appearance and style of locally published magazines.

What kind of results are we getting?

Reports from the field indicate that the publications program is one of the most effective weapons that we have in countering the lies and distortions of the Communists about the United States.

One series of 18 books on science subjects for students, following initial publication with USIA support, racked up such impressive sales figures that the publisher undertook a second printing, with assistance, of all 18 titles, plus a third printing of 12.

In Colombia, two titles were adopted as university texts.

In Mexico, a book published through USIA sponsorship had such an impact that the Soviets published a "reply" in an attempt to reduce its influence.

In the past 2 years, 60 Spanish-language editions and 77 Portuguese-language editions have been sold out, while 45 books in Spanish and 57 in Portuguese have been reprinted.

These are impressive statistics, Mr. President, and they show we have made great strides in our "war of words" in Latin America.

But much still remains to be done. There are still many areas which are not being reached.

The major problem is distribution.

Distances are great in Latin America, and customs regulations are varied and frustrating. Surface transportation from country to country is slow and un-

certain. The cost of air freight is prohibitive. Systems for payment and accounting among outlets, wholesalers, and publishers are, at best, inadequate. There is always the possibility that a book may be produced in large quantities at low cost for a known market but—because of any combination of the factors cited—gather dust in a warehouse or in a forgotten railway car on a remote siding.

We must redouble our efforts to eliminate these problems, and if it is necessary to increase the budget of the USIA book program to do so, I would strongly urge such action.

A failure in the distribution system means that the whole effort to produce a book has been wasted. Effective, comprehensive distribution is every bit as important as the selection of the titles, the choice of translators and the contract with the publishers.

It is of the utmost importance that we reach into every corner of every country with the message of freedom, because when the people of Latin America read of the deeds of Washington and of Lincoln, when they read of the goals and aspirations of Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Johnson, they will know that we and they have a common destiny.

Understanding cannot be accomplished without communication, and in a region as large and diverse, both politically and geographically, as is Latin America, this is a task of extraordinary difficulty.

Language differences complicate the problem. Before overestimating the magnitude of this particular obstacle, however, we would do well to recall George Bernard Shaw's description of Great Britain and the United States as two countries separated by a common language.

Communication between ourselves and the people of Latin America, in brief, is a complicated task, demanding maximum effort. Understanding needs care and attention to survive and grow. Misunderstanding, unfortunately, feeds on itself and grows like a cancer.

Overall, Mr. President, I think we are making real progress in overcoming the distorted image which the Communists have painted of the United States. Much more must be done. There are weaknesses and shortcomings in our present programs, but the dedicated men and women of the U.S. Information Agency are doing everything in their power to overcome them.

We in Congress must give them all the support they require. When we do, we cannot fail because we have truth and right on our side.

LLOYD W. SMITH RETIREMENT

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, the recent retirement of Lloyd W. Smith, of the Burlington and Great Northern Railroads marks the end of a remarkable and effective career. He has been in the industry for 39 years.

Mr. Smith has served the railroad industry and Congress by his professional and always candid work. It has been my great privilege to have known Smith both personally and professionally. I

The riots that have occurred are calculated to produce the reports that have been written and the reaction in the U.S. which follows with Pavlovian predictability.

The rioters know exactly what they are doing and why. These anti-American demonstrations are about as spontaneous as demonstrations at the Republican National Convention—and just about as indicative of real public sentiment.

They can be turned on and off again like a garden hose. The same American who might get lynched at the Vien Hoa Dao pagoda today might be received with impeccable courtesy a couple of days or even a couple of hours later.

The same gang of young hoodlums who chased Americans around a few weeks ago burning cars and generally raising hell eagerly received this reporter at their headquarters a few days ago to smoke his cigarettes and discuss their future plans.

This sort of tactical anti-Americanism is not really expected to intimidate Americans in Saigon.

Its first purpose is to bring pressure on the American mission to stop the crackdown on dissident Buddhist elements in the north.

And beyond that it is designed to get the U.S. government and public so fed up with the whole problem of Viet Nam that a general handwashing impulse will become irresistible.

It is hard to exaggerate the limited scope of these disturbances up to now.

The truly remarkable—indeed almost unaccountable—fact about Saigon today is the utter impunity with which Americans wander around the city night and day.

Unless he's deliberately looking for trouble—as reporters sometimes must—an American could be completely unaware of any of the unpleasantness that he might expect to find in almost any other town.

He might get his pockets picked. He might possibly be held up in a dark alley. He might even, if he happened to be very unlucky, get himself blown up in Viet Cong operation or zapped by friendly American bullets.

But the chances of this are almost as remote as the chances of being run down by a car while crossing Connecticut Avenue at tea time.

The mysterious fact is that in a city presumably swarming with dyed in the wool Viet Cong, almost none of these extremely vulnerable Americans here gets hurt.

No one is very sure why this is so. One common and plausible theory is that the Viet Cong make a very good thing out of Americans in Saigon financially.

The Viet Cong, it is widely believed, have the controlling interest in the aspects of Saigon's cultural life recently mentioned by Sen. J. W. Fulbright.

And if through indiscriminate rough stuff these establishments were shut down or put off limits to any American servicemen, the one who would be really put out would be Victor Charlie, the Viet Cong sympathizer, himself.

It may be that what seems like a sort of conspiracy of security may not last forever. For the time being, however, Americans here sleep a little bit better at night because of it.

And their dreams are not very much disturbed by staged convulsions at the other end of town.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, if there be no further morning business, I ask unanimous consent that morning business be terminated.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business?

If not, morning business is concluded.

THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION ON VIETNAM

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, Webster's dictionary defines the word credibility as "the quality or state of being believed." Increasingly of late the Johnson administration has been drawing critical fire for its lack of credibility, and the phrase "credibility gap" has come into an extensive use.

In part, this can be attributed to the normal functioning of partisan politics intensified by the competition of an election year. Thus, charges about the existence of a credibility gap are frequently raised by the administration's partisan opponents. But although the working of political partisanship has intensified the debate, it is not the basic source of the criticism. Increasing numbers of prominent spokesmen within the President's own party openly deplore the gap between words and deeds. Indeed, in several areas, it is Democratic criticism which has been the sharpest. In addition, a growing number of newspaper editors and columnists have registered concern over the fact that the administration's official words of the moment and its subsequent actions are all too often strangers.

Mr. President, the credibility of those who hold in their hands the power to affect the lives of all Americans and millions of people around the world is a precious and fragile thing. The task of constructing and maintaining it is difficult, demanding, and never ending.

A government's credibility cannot be assured by simple and frequent incantations of "believe us."

It is born not of a single deed but comes into being out of a long series of matched words and actions. Likewise, the erosion of a government's credibility occurs slowly and after a long series of mismatched words and deeds, of nuclear goals, and confusing and contradictory methods.

Mr. President, the borderline between public faith and public distrust is not clearly marked. But once it is crossed, the capacity of the government, however worthy or honorable its intentions, to govern effectively may be permanently damaged.

In a democratic and diverse society no administration can design a set of policies acceptable to all, and political disagreement is inevitable. But loss of faith in a government's credibility involves much more than differences of political opinion. The erosion of credibility not only intensifies the criticism of those who are politically opposed to its policies but erodes the stabilizing support of those who would otherwise agree. Thus, a policy, or a set of policies, may be emasculated, not because they are wrong or because too many people oppose the objective sought but because too many examples of lack of candor on the part of the Government generate disillusionment and public enthusiasm is replaced by public apathy.

The concept of policymaking by con-

sensus has been widely attributed to the President, and has now become a household word. If this is another term for majority rule then it is nothing more than a truism. The practice of consensus politics is the essence of democracy.

But in a democracy, the manner in which consensus is achieved is as important as the consensus itself. And in achieving consensus there is no better standard than the President's own oft-stated principle, "let us reason together." But the enunciation of a principle does not make it a reality. Taking the record of the past 2½ years as a whole the administration has more often than not sought to build consensus by public confusion, rather than public reasoning. This political strategy has often been successful in securing enactment of the administration's program. But the total effect of this strategy has also served to dilute the prestige of the Presidential office and to erode the public's faith in the credibility of the administration.

This strategy of consensus by confusion is most despaired by the administration's partisan opponents. Whatever else may be said of the President, all recognize him as a masterful political tactician. Mr. Johnson is a past master of throwing his potential opponents off balance so as to better pave the way for the acceptance of his proposals, and he has practiced this strategy with supreme skill.

But, Mr. President, there is a difference between political shrewdness and political cynicism. There is a thin line between legitimate rough and tumble partisan politics and illegitimate public deception. And there is a growing impression that the line has been crossed too often.

During the past 2½ years there has been a growing number of episodes which serve to raise doubts as to the credibility of the Johnson administration's conduct in domestic affairs. Without question, however, the credibility gap charge has been applied most often and most tellingly to the administration's handling of its Vietnam policy.

In recent weeks attention has been focused on whether or not our forces in Vietnam are suffering from shortages of war materials. Mr. President, if we know anything about past military build-ups of the type that have occurred in Vietnam we know that certain shortages will almost inevitably occur. The American people recognize this and if the shortages which occur do not reflect gross and inept mismanagement this would be accepted as one of the harsh facts of war, which at best is organized confusion.

But what has been the administration's response to disclosures first by the public press and then by congressional investigating committees, that shortages have in fact developed in Vietnam? Typically the administration's first reaction was to categorically deny that any shortages whatsoever existed. The Secretary of Defense branded any suggestion of shortages as pure "baloney." Whether or not these shortages have seriously hampered our military effort there or caused a greater loss of life among American

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troops than would otherwise be the case is not yet clear and may never be clear.

However, Mr. President, the most revealing and disturbing aspect of this episode has been the administration's over-reaction to its critics. The administration, assuming a posture that admits to no mistakes, has dogmatically and militantly denied the existence of shortages and has tried to discredit those who reported their existence. This type of intolerant and bellicose reaction only serves to further alienate the critics and to raise new doubts among the administration's supporters as to its overall credibility.

The episode of military shortages is only one of the more recent examples of confusion surrounding this country's involvement in Vietnam. But as it comes after a long series of inconsistent and contradictory statements about our policy in Vietnam, it has taken on added significance.

During the past 2 years the American public, in response to the questions of opinion pollsters, has given overwhelming support to the President. However, in the past few months public opinion polls have registered a growing sense of frustration and agony over Vietnam. And within the past few weeks several polls indicate that less than a majority of the people express satisfaction with the administration's handling of the Vietnam situation.

The record shows that the American people genuinely want to support the President. But it also shows that the public is finding it increasingly difficult to do so. The cause of this erosion of support is a growing confusion as to why we are in Vietnam, what are our objectives there, and what methods are to be used in achieving those objectives.

Mr. President, the administration says that there is no basis for this confusion, and argues that if there is confusion, it is due to the ill-founded and ill-tempered blusterings of a few articulate but misguided critics. But the matter cannot be dismissed this easily. Widespread public confusion does exist, and it is due to the actions of the administration itself.

In this respect a recent statement by Carl T. Rowan, a former official of the Johnson administration, is significant and revealing. He stated:

I left the government five months ago thinking I knew what United States' policy in Vietnam was. Today I haven't the remotest idea.

Mr. Rowan made this statement in a column in which he was trying to decipher the meaning of a flurry of official and unofficial statements by administration spokesmen in response to the suggestion by the able and distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] that the United States might consider negotiating with the Vietcong. The administration was variously reported as being in agreement with Senator KENNEDY, in complete disagreement, and "very close" to Senator KENNEDY's proposals. This display of an administration frantically trying to cover all bets serves as a vivid illustration of the fact that if we do have a clear and consistent policy in Vietnam, one cannot discover it

by listening to the words of the administration purporting to describing and explaining it.

Mr. President, in regard to its development and handling of the Vietnam policy the administration has been afflicted by three weaknesses. First, the administration is unhealthily obsessed with a notion that it is always right and never wrong, or at least that it should so try to present itself as to appear to be beyond error. But this type of strategy inevitably breeds distrust, because no man and no government is immune from the human frailty of miscalculation and misadjustment.

The mark of a great leader is not that he never makes mistakes but that when he does he is strong enough to recognize these mistakes and, therefore, adjust his actions accordingly. This is particularly vital in the conduct of foreign policy, for much more is at stake than the personal reputation of one man or one administration.

A second weakness in the handling of the Vietnam policy is the administration's overpowering urge to be "all things to all people at all times." Thus, the administration is often more concerned with saying and doing those things which will nullify domestic and international criticism of its policy rather than conducting that policy in the way that it believes it is best designed to achieve the objectives sought. But in a long drawn out and complex situation such as Vietnam this continual effort to be all all things to all people ultimately presents the danger that the word of the administration will have little meaning or value to anyone.

The third basic weakness is the administration's aversion to long-range planning and its predisposition to "playing things by ear." Now it may be that somewhere within the bowels of Government there exists a long-range plan complete with contingency programs to take account of unexpected events. But if such a plan exists, it has been carefully concealed.

Thus, Mr. President, while it is easy to determine where we have been in Vietnam it has always been virtually impossible to guess where we might be in the future. This vagueness of direction creates the impression that we are simply reacting to events in Vietnam rather than controlling those events. Daily the impression grows that we are helpless victims of a situation that we cannot control; that we, the most powerful nation in the world, cannot determine our own destiny.

The administration continually proclaims that its Vietnam policy is clear, consistent and well defined and that those who do not understand it are simply ignorant of the record. But although the administration says that confusion should not exist and desperately wishes that it would not exist, confusion grows both at home and abroad.

It is a confusion born of inconsistent and contradictory explanations, of vaguely expressed goals and unclear means, and of sweeping proclamations pregnant with glittering generalities but empty of concrete meaning. After a

prolonged exposure to this type of record, the American public and the world at large find it ever more difficult to believe what the administration says at any given time and are increasingly uneasy about what the administration may say and do at any given time in the future.

Mr. President, the erosion of the administration's credibility began long before the military shortages episode or the contorted reactions to recent proposals that the United States consider negotiating with the Vietcong. Indeed the seeds of doubt and confusion can be found even in the administration's explanation of why we are in Vietnam.

The reason we are there is really quite simple. The administration is convinced that the Vietcong constitute a form of aggressive, expansionist communism, which if left unchecked might mean that all of southeast Asia and possibly the entire Asian community will come under a Communist rule directed and controlled from Peking. Thus, our commitment in Vietnam can be seen as a logical extension of a nearly two decades old foreign policy principle which aims at the containment of totalitarian communism.

Mr. President, much of the questioning of our Vietnam policy comes from those who doubt that this is a genuine example of expansionist communism. Criticism is also registered by those who may accept the argument that this is an example of expansionist communism but who disagree with the strategy we are employing to halt its spread. Most of these critics accept the containment principle but argue either that it is unnecessary to invoke it in this particular situation or that we are employing the wrong techniques to achieve it. There are also a few critics who suggest that the containment principle, used so effectively in Europe and the Middle East, simply cannot be applied to Asia.

But the exploration of these arguments is not the purpose of these remarks. For the purpose of this discussion, I accept that the Vietcong movement in South Vietnam is an example of expansionist communism and that it is in our national interest to take reasonable steps to prevent its growth. If this be true, there is no question that the majority of the American people would support our effort in Vietnam.

But how, in fact, does the administration explain our position in Vietnam? Unfortunately, it almost never uses the simple and clear language of the containment policy and the defense of our national interest. Instead, it talks in grandiose generalities which seem to have little relationship to the reality of the situation in southeast Asia. For example, it talks about defending freedom and democracy. These are admirable objectives to be sure, but who among us now believes that there is any meaningful freedom and democracy in southeast Asia to be defended.

The administration talks about honoring commitments. It often implies that we are bound by the SEATO Treaty. But if that be so, then none of the other members of the organization seem to believe it to be the case. Apparently, the

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administration does not either, as is evident by the fact that it has never really consulted with the members of the organization in regard to our Vietnam policy.

Mr. President, the administration talks most often about a commitment to the nation of South Vietnam as if we had entered into some solemn and binding agreement with the Government and the people. In this respect, President Johnson frequently implies that whether we like it or not President Eisenhower made a commitment to Vietnam which we are honorbound to observe. In point of fact, the so-called Eisenhower commitment is nothing more than a letter to the Diem government offering economic aid and technical assistance with the conditional provision that the Diem government begin to institute extensive social, economic and political reforms.

Being fully aware of the niceties of diplomacy and the necessities of politics, one can appreciate why the administration cannot always simply and directly say that we are in Vietnam because we believe it to be in our national interest. But continual harping on the notion of honoring commitments no one understands, ultimately destroys public confidence in our position there.

Too often the administration justifies our position in terms of narrow legalisms. This not only obscures our basic reasons for being there, but also raises doubts that the administration itself is convinced that we are, in fact, fighting a form of expansionist, imperialistic communism.

Mr. President, reduced to its simplest and most meaningful terms our objective is to prevent the spread of totalitarian communism to South Vietnam and into the rest of southeast Asia. Prior to 1965, this objective was sought primarily by the use of technical advice and economic aid aimed at the internal strengthening of South Vietnam so that it could better prevent a Communist takeover. Increasingly of late, however, we have committed vast military forces in an effort to achieve that objective.

The administration says that our objectives are limited; to guarantee an independent and peaceful South Vietnam. And, I believe that our objectives are, in fact, really limited. But simple declarations do not prove it or convince our adversaries or our potential allies. If we are really willing, as I believe we are, to settle for a truly independent South Vietnam, one that is neither controlled nor dependent upon the United States or Hanoi, Moscow, or Peking, we must do more than simply mouth the words. Our adversaries and those around the world who are inherently suspicious of our intentions need more than vague verbal declarations.

The administration has declared our objectives to be limited but its words and actions have given rise to considerable doubt and suspicion as to the precise limits of those objectives. The picture has been particularly confused by the administration's words and actions regarding a settlement that would satisfy those objectives.

The administration has said that we would be willing to negotiate anywhere

at any time without prior reservations or conditions. But at the same time that we issue such unconditional statements, we also assert that we will not negotiate directly with the Vietcong. Now it may be that there are sound reasons for refusing to negotiate with the Vietcong. Certainly it would be foolhardy for the United States to agree to negotiate only with the Vietcong as Hanoi and Peking continually demand.

But the tragic thing, Mr. President, is that if our position is really sound it has been lost to world opinion by the inevitable loss of faith in the credibility of a government which loudly proclaims with one mouth that it will negotiate without prior reservations and then quietly asserts with another mouth that it will actually negotiate only under prespecified conditions.

Moreover, the practice of escalating our military commitment in Vietnam at the very same time we announce anew our desire for a settlement only serves to increase doubts among friend and foe alike as to the precise nature of our intentions, even though those intentions may in fact be entirely honorable and our objectives truly limited.

The credibility of the administration was further weakened by the disclosure that we may have rejected several "peace feelers" from the Communists. It might well have been the case that these feelers were not worthy of serious consideration, that they did not provide a reasonable basis for negotiation. But again, as so often in the past, the administration was discredited in the eyes of many not necessarily because its position was unsound, but because it acknowledged those contacts only after documentation in the public press made it impossible to deny their existence.

Against the background of ringing declarations to explore all possible avenues for a peaceful settlement the disclosure that the administration had rejected these feelers added fuel to the growing doubts and criticism about our Vietnam policy.

Mr. President, when our changed position in Vietnam became evident in late 1964 and early 1965, it brought forth the first serious public questioning and debate of our policy. The administration sought not to clarify that debate but to prevent it. Ultimately the questioning and criticism could not be prevented. The administration then adopted a strategy of attempting to nullify each fresh wave of criticism by seeming to agree with the demands of the critics. But this only served to bring confusion and more questioning of the Government's credibility.

Two recent examples are illustrative. As doubts, at home and abroad, as to the sincerity of our desire for a peaceful settlement continued to grow in late 1965 the administration staged a massive peace offensive during January of 1966. The bombing of North Vietnam was temporarily halted and top administration officials and ambassadors were sent scurrying around the world, all proclaiming that the United States really did want a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. Ambassador Harriman went

to Poland, Yugoslavia, and India. McGeorge Bundy went to Ottawa. Arthur Goldberg visited the Vatican, Rome, Paris and London. Vice President HUBERT HUMPHREY made a country-hopping tour in the Far East. Ambassador Kohler conferred with the Soviet officials in Moscow. G. Mennen Williams talked to leaders of several African nations, and Thomas C. Mann did the same in Mexico City.

It was indeed a Texas-sized peace offensive. And while the administration was obviously sincere in hoping that this display might actually serve as a catalyst for the beginnings of realistic negotiations, it was generally apparent that this was a staged affair, political display aimed more at nullifying the mounting criticism challenging the sincerity of our offer for negotiation rather than a careful calculated effort to secure a peaceful settlement.

If in fact, Mr. President, we had been making the proper efforts in exploring all possible diplomatic channels, then such a spectacular display was unnecessary. If we had not been doing these things, then this display of jet diplomacy would convince no one, friend or foe.

Another example of this type of administration strategy was the calling of the recent Honolulu conference. The peace offensive had failed, the bombing in North Vietnam had been resumed, and the internal political situation in South Vietnam showed no improvement. Increasingly, criticism was being directed at the failure of the United States to bring about any of the desperately needed economic, social, and political reforms in South Vietnam which all observers, including our top military leadership, recognize as being absolutely necessary to any genuine solution in South Vietnam. Thus, the President and an impressive number of top Government officials flew off to a hastily convened conference in Honolulu with Premier Ky and other members of his government. After a few hectic days at the conference table, the Honolulu declaration was issued with great fanfare.

The administration has hailed the Honolulu declaration as a historic document and has bitterly complained that the public press and congressional critics had failed to give it the recognition and praise that it deserves. In point of fact, American public and world reaction to the conference was precisely what it deserved. Again, while no one would argue that the goals announced by the conference were not genuinely desirable, all recognized that the impetus for the conference was the growing criticism of the administration's conduct in Vietnam rather than a logical extension of its long-range policy. There is depressingly little evidence that we are ready or capable, even at this late date, of instituting the programs of aid and reform that would be needed to achieve the goals so proudly proclaimed.

Mr. President, it is no wonder, then, that the American people and the world in general are confused about our policy in Vietnam. Our basic reasons for being in Vietnam have never been adequately explained. The objectives we seek there

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have never been clearly delineated. And the administration's zigzagging and contorted efforts to answer every critic simultaneously have beclouded our entire involvement.

But none of these has so eroded the American public's faith in the administration's credibility as has the yawning gap between what we have said would be necessary to achieve our objectives there and what we have actually done there. It is here that we find the essence of the credibility gap.

The most glowing example of the lack of credibility is to be found in the depressing record of the administration from time to time telling the American people that we would not perform a certain act, but then later initiating that very act. And in so doing on each occasion the administration has proclaimed that the performance of that particular action would solve the situation in Vietnam. But, in reality, as the American people have seen, the situation remains the same or grows worse. And as the administration's promises for a solution continue to flow, the public's faith that a solution will really be achieved continues to wane.

In 1964 President Johnson frequently and fervently proclaimed that our objectives in Vietnam would be achieved without the commitment of major American military forces and loss of American lives. Millions of American people voted for Mr. Johnson in November 1964, because they agreed with this declaration of policy. But our position in Vietnam today bears no resemblance to that of 1964 or to the President's declaration of what it would be. President Johnson said we would not commit American lives, and that we would not extend the war to North Vietnam, and that the major effort against the Communists in South Vietnam would have to be carried by the South Vietnamese themselves. But today we bomb North Vietnam around the clock and in recent weeks more Americans have died on the battlefield than South Vietnamese.

Our military commitment and effort in Vietnam has been increased in a series of graduated moves. Each step of the escalation has occurred after the administration had proclaimed that such steps would be unnecessary and undesirable. However, when the administration felt that conditions forced it to abandon its former position, it has stated, or at least implied, that each additional extension in the military commitment would solve the problem. The decision to bomb North Vietnam was at least implicitly justified on the basis that cutting supply lines would isolate the Vietcong and allow the South Vietnamese Army to defeat its adversary. But today more men and more equipment flow from North Vietnam into the south than ever before.

If the administration knew that the act they denied would take place would be performed, then it is an act of misrepresentation to the American people and a display of callous cynicism. If the administration thought that the performance of that given action would solve the problem in South Vietnam then

the record can only show that the administration has continued to compound misjudgment with misjudgment.

Likewise, on the political scene each change in the Saigon government has been heralded by the administration as the one which would at last bring true stability to South Vietnam. But none of this has come to pass. And the present Government to which the President has given his personal endorsement has not only failed to achieve stability but has so acted to increase internal tensions and conflicts among the South Vietnamese. Mr. McNamara's statement that the present conflict between the Buddhists and the Ky regime is a healthy sign, is naive and ridiculous and an example of the fantastic contortions which the administration has had to go through to try to justify and explain the internal situation in Vietnam, which cannot be anything else but a severe indictment of our lack of vision and leadership in that troubled land.

In September of 1964 President Johnson proclaimed:

We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys . . . I want to be very cautious and careful and use it as a last resort when I start dropping bombs around that are likely to involve American boys in a war in Asia with 700 million Chinese . . . so we are not going north and we are not going south; we are going to continue to try to get them (the South Vietnamese) to save their own freedom with their own men.

Mr. President, the American people are mature and wise enough to recognize that in a complex situation like Vietnam things do not always happen as we would like them to, or as we expect them to. But constant repetition of proclamations to the effect that a particular action will not take place, followed by ringing declarations, when this very act occurs, that this, finally, is the action that will provide the solution is destroying the public faith and is feeding the growing belief that this administration neither knows what it wants in Vietnam nor how to achieve it.

The record of the past can only create anxiety and fear of the future.

Mr. President, one hears a great deal about the agony of Vietnam, and it is indeed America's most agonizingly difficult and complex foreign involvement of the 20th century.

One of the greatest tragedies of this experience is that although America's intentions there are basically honorable and our objectives truly limited, we have conducted ourselves in such a way that ever larger numbers of people, both at home and abroad, find it impossible to believe the sincerity of our actions there.

Throughout the noncommunist world there is a great reservoir of support for this country's dedicated opposition to the expansion of communism. Thus, although internal political conditions may make it impossible for many foreign leaders, particularly in Asia, to openly identify with the United States, most of them at least share in the general objective of containing communism in Asia.

At home the overwhelming majority of the American people support the containment policy, and most believe that a

takeover by the Communists in South Vietnam would be a discouraging defeat for the United States and against the long-range interests of the free world. Thus, the American people, at heart, genuinely want to support the administration's policy in Vietnam.

Mr. President, no one of the numerous examples of mismatched words and deeds, which have been reviewed here, has been enough to destroy faith in the credibility of the administration's Vietnam policy. But the ever accumulating list of inconsistencies, contradictions, vague explanations, and persistent refusal to acknowledge even minor mistakes inevitably sows the seeds of doubt, disillusionment and apathy. The result is that eventually even candid statements and forthright explanations become suspect.

Thus, Mr. President, even though the administration's basic intentions and goals may be sound and worthy, the policy which it pursues may fail, not because it is basically wrong, but because its conduct of that policy has been so shoddy that even those who believe in its ultimate rightness refuse the administration their positive and energetic support out of disillusionment and despair.

RECESS

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Thereupon (at 10 o'clock and 43 minutes a.m.) the Senate took a recess subject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 12:39 p.m., when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. HART in the chair).

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 13712) to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to extend its protection to additional employees, to raise the minimum wage, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H.R. 13712) to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to extend its protection to additional employees, to raise the minimum wage, and for other purposes, was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

PERSONAL STATEMENT

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, it is a matter of regret to me that my duties as chairman of the mediation panel in the airline machinist dispute have occupied me all morning and have prevented my being here earlier to speak.

I very much appreciate the indulgence of the Senate and the Senate staff which enables me to speak at this time on sev-